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This thesis aims at analyzing the relationship between corporate income taxation and 
innovation in Europe to further the discussion about which policy tool is optimal to encourage 
innovation. This was done using a fixed effects regression on a panel of data of European 
OECD member states for the time period 1981-2017, using the statutory corporate tax rate 
and the number of patents per million inhabitants. The results of both regressions fail to show 
a significant effect of corporate income taxation on the number of patents. This is in contrast 
to previous findings of studies using U.S. data, which could be for a few different reasons, 
such as differences in patenting systems, economic and cultural structure, but also 
methodology. The obtained results point to corporate income tax not being the optimal 
instrument to encourage innovation and decreasing it to be unlikely to have the desired effect, 
which means more granular and directed research is required into what instruments, which 
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1. Introduction 
More and more, innovation is becoming a central topic in both business and the economy as a 
whole. Innovation is generally considered as the act of creating something new or improved, 
most commonly a product or process, that adds value or more specifically, can be made 
available for use.1 As technology progresses at an exponential rate (Kurzweil, 2001), keeping 
up with innovation is the only way for companies to stay competitive. Indeed, nowadays, 
innovation is regarded as one of the main drivers of economic growth. Although innovation 
has always been the key to societal advancements, it was only in the 20th century that it 
entered into economic considerations. One of the very first to recognize the role of innovation 
was Schumpeter, who coined the term “creative destruction” (Hospers, 2005). Today, the 
works of Solow (1957) and Romer (1986) are seminal in economics, and the widely accepted 
endogenous growth theory has become the primary model of economic growth.2  
In Europe, the EU has set the goal for its member states to invest 3% of the GDP into R&D. 
This goal was first formulated in 2000 in the Lisbon strategy, but most countries hadn’t 
reached it by the specified end point of 2010, so it was reformulated for 2020 as ‘Europe 
2020’ (Armstrong, 2012). Since this goal failed to be reached by most members again, the EU 
has now re-affirmed the same target for 2030 (Zubascu, 2021). The fact that the goal still 
hasn’t been reached, clearly shows that there is a need for finding the appropriate instruments 
to encourage private R&D in the future. In fact, the EU wants to double down on low R&D in 
businesses and increase incentives (Council of the European Union, 2021).  
There are different ways to encourage R&D and innovation. Patents, R&D tax incentives, 
subsidies and patent boxes are commonly regarded as the options governments have to 
address the underinvestment of private R&D due to the gap between private and social returns 
 
1 There is no “right” definition of innovation and there are many interpretations of innovation. For standardized, somewhat 
official definitions of innovation, we can look to the ISO 56000:2020 and the Oslo Manual 2018 (4th edition). The two 
definitions have in common that they both require an outcome that adds value (ISO, 2020) or can be made available for use 
(OECD/Eurostat, 2018). Further, both assume that an innovation is a new or improved process or product. 
2 Solow is the name associated with the “residual” or total factor productivity, the up to that point by standard macro-
economic models unexplained part of economic growth. His work is now considered the basis to endogenous growth theory. 
Romer (1986) developed a model where growth resulted from endogenous accumulation of knowledge rather than regarding 
the technological progress as exogenous, giving rise to the endogenous growth theory, which Aghion & Howitt (1992) and 
Grossman & Helpman (1994) further contributed to. 
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of R&D (Nussim & Sorek, 2017).3 However, there has been discussion in literature whether 
those instruments are effective at encouraging innovation. Gaessler et al. (2021) for example, 
call into question whether patent boxes serve the intended purpose with regards to innovation. 
The patent box schemes, they conclude, merely encourage cross-border transfers of patents, 
but don’t increase the innovative activity. Authors that study R&D tax credit more in detail, 
also find that their effectiveness is very dependent on circumstances of the firm (Kasahara et 
al., 2013, Cappelen et al., 2012, Sterlacchini & Venturini, 2019). 
If some of the instruments currently used are shown not be as effective as intended, research 
into other avenues to encourage innovation must be conducted.  
Achieving a higher level of innovation is not only central to achieving continued economic 
growth and remaining competitive, as well as hitting the EU targets, it is also the only way to 
successfully manage the transition towards becoming a sustainable economy. The OECD’s 
green growth strategy, for example, highlights the importance of a shift towards more mindful 
consideration of resources and potentially damaging practices. Innovation is described as one 
of the sources of growth in this strategy and is considered the core of transforming an 
economy (OECD, 2011). With climate change taking a more central role in consumer 
awareness and political discussions, and governments imposing stricter restrictions, for 
companies with a large carbon footprint, innovation is the key to survival. Particularly, a 
groundbreaking court decision in Den Haag has recently shown that companies could be 
forced to change their practices through lawsuits. In the ruling, Shell has been obligated to 
reduce their emissions by 45% until 2030 (Spiegel, 2021, de Rechtspraak, 2021). This is a 
clear sign for other companies to step up their game and work on a reduction of their 
emissions, which in many industries is not possible to achieve without considerable 
innovations. 
Much research has been done to determine the effect of R&D tax credits on innovation. 
However, there is much less on how the effective corporate tax rate affects the innovative 
activity of an organization. As economic growth slows down in the developed countries, 
which includes the European countries, and the importance of sustainable economies 
increases, policy makers must identify all possible avenues to encourage innovation. It is 
 
3 Some issues surrounding the topic of innovation are considered, in economic terms, market failures. This is due to 
innovation being similar to a public good in terms of non-rivalry and costly excludability (Nussim & Sorek, 2017). Since 
firms have difficulty appropriating the benefits from an innovation, they invest less than socially desirable. In addition to that, 
there is a gap between the private return to the innovator and the cost of external capital (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). This causes 
under-investment in innovation activities that results in market failures, which policies aim at reducing. 
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therefore of particular importance to clearly understand the interdependences that exist 
between innovation and the policy tools available to governments. This thesis aims at 
contributing further insight into the effects of taxation on innovation, measured by the level of 
patenting, for the European member countries of the OECD. It achieves this by conducting a 
regression analysis on a panel of data for the observed countries in the period from 1981 to 
2017. The results fail to find a significant effect of corporate income tax and the number of 
patents, which contrasts what previous publications have shown (Akcigit et al., 2021, 
Atanassov & Liu, 2020, Mukherjee et al., 2017). It is concluded that several reasons for such 
differences exist, which will be elaborated on in later chapters. 
The thesis is structured as follows: In chapter 2, an overview over relevant literature will be 
given. Chapter 3 will provide background information on the specifics of corporate taxation 
and patenting in Europe. The reasoning behind the analysis, the data used and the empirical 
analysis will be explained and conducted in chapters 4 to 6, with the results then being 
presented and discussed in chapter 7. Suggestions for future research will also be given in 
chapter 7, while the thesis will be concluded with chapter 8.  
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2. Literature Review 
As innovation is the main driver of economic growth, R&D incentives, be it in tax credit or in 
subsidy form, aim at increasing innovation in a country. As such, most of the literature 
concerning R&D incentives aims at determining the success of such measures. There is a vast 
array of literature studying the link between tax rates and innovation, with different authors 
approaching this in different ways. The existing literature in this area can be divided into 
several categories. However, even within those, researchers take very different approaches in 
their analyses. The review of existing literature will therefore be structured as follows: since 
the bulk of literature focuses on the effects of R&D tax credits, the first section will be 
devoted to this field. Secondly, as this paper focuses on the effect of overall taxation on 
innovation, the next section will give an overview of this literature. Lastly, further literature 
pertinent to the subject matter will be presented. 
2.1 The effects of R&D tax credits 
A large portion of existing literature revolves around the effectiveness of R&D tax credits 
(Berger, 1993, Bloom et al., 2002, Cappelen et al., 2012, Czarnitzki et al., 2011, Rao, 2016, 
Thomson, 2017, among others), measuring different outcomes of the effects. Most studies 
relate R&D tax credits to R&D expenditures (Berger, 1993, Kasahara et al., 2013, Rao, 2016, 
Bloom et al., 2002), while some use other measures of innovative activity.4 Chen & Yang 
(2019) and Tian et al. (2020) for example, extend their scope of measurement by one further 
component, namely patents, subsuming these observations under the term firm innovation. 
Ivus et al. (2021) also use this combination, adding R&D intensity as a third measure. 
Czarnitzki et al. (2011) also use multiple measures to determine innovation output, but very 
different ones, such as the number of new products, their sales and the originality of 
innovations. Cappelen et al. (2012) use a similar approach, but also investigate patenting. 
While the majority of studies was conducted using U.S. data, particularly before the turn of 
the century (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000), more recent studies have branched out into including 
not only other OECD countries, but also emerging economies, such as Argentina (Crespi et 
al., 2016), Taiwan (Chiang et al., 2012, Yang et al., 2012) and China (Chen & Yang, 2019, 
 
4 When speaking of innovation, some form of measurable outcome is assumed, in accordance with the official ISO and 
OECD definitions (ISO, 2020, OECD/Eurostat, 2018). The term innovative activity, on the other hand, will subsume all 
activity that is related to R&D, inventing and innovating from here on out.  
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Tian et al., 2020). This newer development in research can be attributed, in part, to the fact 
that many of these countries have only recently started implementing systems to encourage 
R&D.  
All publications studying the relationship between R&D tax credit and R&D investment have 
in common that they find statistically significant effects, albeit with different magnitudes 
(Kasahara et al., 2013, Thomson, 2017, Rao, 2016, Bloom et al., 2002, among others). 
Considering they have been conducted on a number of countries and for different time 
periods, with different methodologies, overall, this gives strong indications towards R&D tax 
credits being a suitable policy instrument to encourage innovative activity. The results are not 
sufficient to predict an effect on innovation, as R&D investments alone have no value in 
explaining outcome, which is a prerequisite for the term innovation according to the ISO and 
OECD (ISO, 2020, OECD/Eurostat, 2018) definition. However, many studies include other 
indicators of innovative activity, such as patents or new products, also finding positive effects 
of R&D tax credits (Ivus et al., 2021, Czarnitzki et al., 2011, Tian et al., 2020, among others). 
Therefore, the effectiveness of R&D tax credits can be concluded to be significant. 
There are also publications studying the effect of R&D tax credits on a more granular level, 
with specific questions in mind. Castellacci and Lie (2015), for example, conduct a meta-
regression analysis on the differences of R&D tax credit impact on innovation across 
industries and find that there are indeed sectors that respond better to tax credit compared to 
others, in particular SMEs, as well as firms in the service and low-tech sector. Both Makeeva 
et al. (2019) and Mitchell et al. (2020) focus their question of the effects of R&D tax credit on 
innovative companies, with the former looking at firm performance of innovative companies, 
while the latter is interested in the impact of R&D tax credit on young innovative firms. 
Sterlacchini & Venturini (2019), on the other hand, using a sample of firms from four 
European countries, study how the research activity of manufacturing firms is influenced by 
R&D tax incentives, and find that the impact varies by firm size, with small companies 
driving the observed effect. Chiang et al. (2012) look at the effectiveness on R&D tax credit 
in dependency of where a firm is in its life cycle, focusing on data from Taiwan and using 
actual tax credit data rather than a dummy variable. They suggest that tax credits have 
different effects when firms are in different stages of their life cycle, an interesting insight to 
keep in mind when it comes to the discussion of optimal policy tools.  
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2.2 Corporate tax and innovation 
The link between corporate income tax and innovation remains fairly unexplored, with only a 
few pieces of literature on the subject, three of which are on U.S. data. The manner in which 
this thesis adds to the literature is twofold. Firstly, it extends the overall literature on corporate 
income taxation and innovation. Secondly, it gives a perspective on the relationship in 
Europe.  
Atanassov & Liu (2020) explore how tax cuts affect innovation and find that large tax cuts on 
corporate income stimulate innovation, albeit with a two year delay. They focus their analysis 
on the U.S. and use tax change as their main explanatory variable. Atanassov & Liu juxtapose 
their findings with the results from a similar study done by Mukherjee et al. (2017), who find 
insignificant effects for tax cuts, and only significant effects for tax increases, and give 
convincing arguments on why there do indeed seem to be significant effects of tax cuts. They 
conclude that tax cuts lead to a higher innovative output, which can in turn lead to a positive 
effect on firm performance and economic growth. 
Akcigit et al. (2021) provide a thorough analysis on the effects of taxation on innovation, 
examining both macro- and microeconomic effects and exploring multiple indicators of 
innovation. Their analysis on the macroeconomic level of the relationship between taxation 
and the number of patents serves as a blueprint of sorts for the empirical analysis performed 
here. Overall, their results indicate significant effects of the corporate and personal income tax 
on innovation indicators, such as the number of patents, citations and inventors. 
Shao & Xiao (2019) use the 2006 tax reform in China to conduct a similar study on the effects 
of corporate taxes on firm innovation, measured by the number of filed patents. They, too, 
find significant and positive effects of tax reduction on innovation. 
2.3 Other pertinent literature 
While most studies pick a specific instrument and study its effectiveness, some studies 
compare two instruments in the endeavor to identify which of either gives better results. 
Busom et al. (2014), for example, pose the question whether R&D tax incentives and R&D 
subsidies are substitutes. They find that they are not, as they are suitable to companies of 
varying size that have very different needs and prerequisites. Based on their findings, they 
suggest an innovation policy that uses these instruments depending on the type of firm. On 
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their own, R&D subsidies are also another category of policy instruments examined in 
literature. Klette et al. (2000), for example, compare fives studies aimed at finding the effect 
of R&D subisidies on firm performance, but conclude that more investigation is required. A 
meta-regression analysis of previous literature conducted by Dimos & Pugh (2016) to 
reconcile heterogenous empirical effects shows the progress in that field since the work of 
Klette et al. (2000), finding an overall positive effect of R&D subsidies, even if of small 
magnitude. However, they can exclude a crowding out effect of R&D subsidies, which at least 
shows they don’t go to waste. 
Gande et al. (2020) approach the question from a legal and institutional perspective and give 
policy recommendations on how to align private innovation to be at the socially optimal level 
through corporate tax rates, while the discussion of optimal growth policy through research 
and taxation is the focus of Gersbach et al. (2018). 
While tax incentives have generally been shown to be effective to encourage R&D, the design 
of the incentives have to be suitable to the tax system of the country implementing them, as 
Elschner et al. (2011) demonstrate.  
A slightly different approach regarding the effects of tax on innovation is taken by Henrekson 
& Sanandaji (2018), who discuss the effects of stock option taxation on the level of venture 
capital (VC) activity, comparing Europe and the U.S. Their study gives very valuable insights 
into possibilities for European governments to shape their R&D policies without resorting to 
decreasing the overall corporate income tax.  
Cheng et al. (2021) turn the question around and, using a U.S. sample, ask what role patents 
play in corporate tax planning in comparison to R&D. Their results suggest that while R&D 
tax credits and deduction serve the intended purpose, patents are used by taxpayers to shift 
their income to lower tax countries and therefore partake in aggressive tax avoidance 
practices. Belz et al. (2017) conduct a meta regression analysis on existing literature to 
identify the effect that R&D expenses have on the effective tax rate. They find a slight 
decrease in effective tax rate for a company with increased R&D intensity, which stems from 
both profit shifting and tax accounting and criticize that in many examples of literature, the 
authors consider only one of them, respectively. 
The OECD also provides literature on the topic of taxation and innovation. Palazzi (2011) 
gives a conceptual overview over the linkage between the two, showing which factors impact 
innovation that may be influenced by tax policies. Suggestions for tax policies are also given, 
among which is the reduction of corporate income taxes.   
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3. Patenting and Taxation in Europe 
3.1 The mechanisms of applying for a patent at the EPO 
The European Patent Office (EPO) was founded in 1977 on the foundation of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC), which is an international co-operation set up with the aims of 
strengthening cooperation between the member states, now 38, unifying the patent application 
process for its member states in terms of patent application procedure and standards and 
establishing the EPO (EPO, n.d.)   
Filing a patent to the EPO requires an invention to be new, involve an inventive step and be 
industrially applicable. More specifically, patents apply to technical and functional aspects of 
an invention. Everything outside of this categorization may be protected under different 
intellectual property (IP) rights, such as copyright, trademarks or design rights (EPO, 2016). 
Important to note is that computer programs or software, are not considered patentable in 
Europe and are instead covered by copyright (EPO, 2016). This is in contrast with the U.S., 
where software has been patentable since the 1980s. The U.S. Patents and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) started viewing software as patentable in the 1980s, although their patentability had 
to be well argued in the beginning. During the 90s, the acceptance of patents for software 
grew until it became established that software can be patented (Bessen & Hunt, 2007). 
Additionally, whereas business models are generally considered to be patentable in the U.S., 
they are a further category that is not considered eligible for patenting in Europe (Ovans, 
2000, EPO, 2016) 
The advantage of filing a patent to the EPO is the possibility to obtain patent protection in all 
EPC member states with one application, resulting in a centralized, and therefore more 
effective, time and cost wise, process (EPO, 2016). 
3.2 Regional distribution of innovation 
In Europe, innovative activity is distributed very unevenly across regions. Eurostat uses R&D 
intensity as a measure. The most R&D intense region in Europe is Braunschweig in Germany, 
followed by Stuttgart, also in Germany and Brabant Wallon and Vlaams Brabant in Belgium. 
Other R&D intense regions, among others, are East Anglia in the UK and Trøndelag in 
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Norway. In terms of R&D intensity, 10% of regions are responsible for 50% of Europe’s 
R&D spending (Science Business, 2019). The distribution of patents across regions roughly 
follows the distribution of R&D patents, showing great regional disparity within countries 
(Eurostat, 2021).  
There seems to be a strong link between large companies’ headquarters and the R&D 
expenditure in that region. For example, the most R&D intensive region in Europe is 
Braunschweig in Germany, which includes Wolfsburg, the location of Volkswagen’s 
headquarters. This region is followed by Stuttgart, where Daimler, Porsche and Bosch have 
their headquarters. In France, the Toulouse region stands out, which is where Airbus is 
located. Similarly, in Vlaams Brabant in Belgium, AB InBev has its headquarters. In those 
regions, there is usually also the presence of strong technical universities, which might 
contribute to the R&D intensity of that region. 
3.3 Corporate Taxation on the European continent 
Taxation of corporations is different in every country in Europe. The differences lie in the 
total effective rate, but also in the way taxes are calculated and which entities of the country 
receive those taxes. In general, we can differentiate between the corporate income tax and a 
capital gains tax (European Comission, 2019). The corporate income tax applies to profits a 
company makes, while the capital gains tax regards any gains derived from assets, such as the 
sale of real estate. Not all countries in Europe differentiate between the two when they tax 
companies. While Ireland, for example, applies the capital gains tax to companies in certain 
gain scenarios, Germany regards capital gains in the same way as profits and includes them in 
the standard corporate tax (European Commission, 2011). Table 1 aims at giving the reader an 
overview of how corporate income taxes vary from country to country. 
All observed countries have in common that they have decreased the overall tax burden on 
corporate income over time. Some countries, such as Great Britain and Ireland, have 
employed a more progressive approach, slowly lowering the tax rates year by year, whereas 
other countries, such as Austria or Germany, lowered the taxes considerably at certain points 
in time, creating a “step” in the tax rate curve.  
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3.4 R&D tax credits and patent boxes 
There are large differences in how each of the European countries handles tax credits for 
R&D and patent box schemes. Table 1 gives an overview of both. As of now, 14 countries in 
Europe offer a patent box regime. Patent boxes are tax schemes, where the profits for IP are 
taxed at a lower rate than usual corporate profits. Each country has chosen to offer a slightly 
different scheme, with some charging higher taxes and some lower. Among the countries with 
the lowest taxes within a patent box scheme are Hungary and Luxembourg, while countries 
such as Italy and Portugal have a considerably higher tax even with the patent box regime. 
 






Max Tax Rate 
in observed 
period 
Tax credit in 
observed period 
(2000-2017) 
Patent box introduction 
year (current tax rate 
under patent box 
regime) 
Austria 25% 55% (1981) Since 2002 -- 
Belgium 25% 48% (1981) Since 2005 2007 (4.44%) 
Czech Republic 19% 45% (1993) Since 2005 -- 
Denmark 22% 40% (1981) Yes -- 
Estonia 20% 26% (2000) No -- 
Finland 20% 61,75% (1982) 2013-2014 -- 
France 32% 50% (1981) Yes 2000 (10&) 
Germany 29,9% 60% (1981) No -- 
Greece 24% 49% (1985) Since 2004 -- 
Hungary 9% 50% (1989) Yes 2003 (0% or 4.5%) 
Ireland 12,5% 50% (1982) Since 2004 1973 (6.25%) 
Iceland 20% 30% (2000) Since 2011 -- 
Italy 27,81% 53,2% (1994) Yes 2015 (13.95%) 
Latvia 20% 25% (1995) 2014-2017 -- 
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Lithuania 15% 24% (2000) Since 2008 2018 (5%) 
Luxembourg 24,94% 37,45% (2000) No 2008 (4.99%) 
Netherlands 25% 48% (1981) Yes 2007 (7%) 
Norway 22% 50,8% (1981) Since 2002 -- 
Poland 19% 40% (1992) Since 2016 2019 (5%) 
Portugal 31,5% 55,12 % (1983) 2003, since 2006 2014 (10.5%) 
Sweden 21,4% 58,1% (1983) Since 2014 -- 
Slovenia 19% 25% (2000) Since 2008 -- 
Slovak Republic 21% 45% (1993) Since 2015 2018 (10.5%) 
Spain 25% 35% (1984) Yes 2008 (10% - federal) 
Switzerland 21,15% 33,05% (1981) No 
At cantonal level (up to 
90% exemption from 
corporate tax) 
United Kingdom 19% 52% (1981) Yes 2013 (10%) 
Data from Atkinson & Andes (2011), Asen & Bunn (2020), OECD (2021a) 
3.5 Comparison with the U.S. 
Since much of the literature concerning the interplay between R&D tax credits, corporate 
taxation and innovation revolves around the U.S., it seems relevant to give a quick overview 
over the differences between the U.S. and the European systems of corporate taxation. The 
U.S. taxes companies at a federal level and at state level, which causes quite a few differences 
between states in terms of tax burden. In contrast to the EU, however, these differences do not 
occur across national borders, which makes taking advantage of lower taxes in a different 
state easier. In Europe, language barriers and larger cultural differences might inhibit 
companies from making such a choice (CILT, 2006). 
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4. Theoretical reasoning  
A lot of focus has been put onto R&D tax incentives and how they affect innovative activity. 
Less research has been conducted on the overall corporate tax rate and how it affects 
innovation. The studies that exist suggest that the overall tax rate also influences companies’ 
decisions to be innovative (Akcigit et al., 2021, Atanassov & Liu, 2020, Mukherjee et al., 
2017).  
Indeed, from an economical point of view, a higher net of profit means more possibilities for 
companies to reinvest some of their profits, which they can choose to do in R&D. Not only 
that, the motivation to invest in R&D also increases if the net returns of the final outcome are 
higher. For U.S. companies, as suggested by Sougiannis (1994), an increase in R&D 
investment leads to an increase in profits and an even higher increase in market value in the 
long term. A similar result is found by Garcia-Manjon and Romero-Merino (2012), who 
examine European top R&D spending firms. Following this logic, if a company retains a 
higher net of profit, increasing the investment in R&D is a smart move. Therefore, it can be 




To conduct the analysis, a panel dataset was constructed compiling data from different 
sources. The resulting panel data contains data of the number of patents, the population, the 
statutory corporate income tax rate, as well as information on tax credits and patent box 
schemes, for the years 1981 to 2017 for all 26 European member states of the OECD.5 Some 
of the data is not available before 1990 for countries previously part of the Warsaw Pact. 
Equally, the data on tax credits was only available from the year 2000. For this reason, two 
separate regressions were conducted. The main regression follows the equation laid out in 
chapter 6, using all 26 countries for the time period 2000 to 2017. For this first regression, the 
joining date to the European Patent Convention (EPC) is also considered, to eliminate a rise in 
patent applications, resulting from the entry into the EPC, from the analysis. A further benefit 
of starting with the EPC joining date is that events such as independence, and reunification of 
Germany in the 1990s is left out of the analysis as well. To conduct an analysis on a balanced 
panel and over more years, a secondary regression is conducted on all countries for which 
patent and tax data was available for the time period 1981 to 2017,6 which means that the tax 
credit dummy has to be left out of the equation as the data is not available for the full time 
period.  
5.1 Number of patents 
5.1.1 Patents as indicators for innovation 
Innovation is something that is difficult to measure on its own. Not only are there many 
different definitions of innovation, the innovative activity itself is also difficult to quantify. It 
is impossible to say how many hobby inventors might be tinkering in their garage at any 
given moment. However, to measure any effects that are in relation to innovation, it is 
important to find a good proxy that depicts innovative activity as accurately as possible. 
Different measures are used in scientific literature, such as R&D expenditure and R&D 
 
5 The mentioned countries are following: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland & United Kingdom 
6 In this case, 16 countries could be analyzed: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland & United Kingdom 
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intensity. Bloom et al. (2002), for example, study the effect of tax credit on R&D investment. 
Similarly, Rao (2016) looks at the link between R&D tax credit and investments. Griliches 
(1990), in particular, studied what one can infer from patent data and found that patents are a 
suitable measure of inventive activity. One reason for this is that the data is easily accessible, 
available in large quantities and quite detailed. Quite a few authors follow this approach. Shao 
& Xiao (2019) for example, use patent as a measure for innovation in their research regarding 
corporate taxes and innovation in China. Patents are similarly used in a study conducted by 
Atanassov & Liu (2020). The Oslo Manual 4 also gives an extensive overview on how 
innovation can be measured and lists intellectual property rights (IPRs), which patents are a 
part of (OECD/Eurostat, 2018). 
It should be mentioned that choosing one of these measures has to follow a specific reasoning, 
as these depict very different stages in the innovative process. In fact, while many 
publications measure R&D investments, the Oslo Manual clarifies that innovation requires 
implementation, which means investment alone is not a suitable measure for innovation per 
se, but rather for innovative activities undertaken by businesses (OECD/Eurostat, 2018). R&D 
investment shows how much a company is spending at a given moment for their R&D 
department. What it fails to show, however, is whether the investment is successful, that is 
whether it results in an innovation that brings the company returns, or whether that investment 
came to naught. The number of patents, on the other hand, is a tangible outcome and shows 
the success of the innovative activity. Still, by looking at the number of patents alone, one 
cannot determine where an increase may potentially stem from. While it is likely that, if the 
number of patents increases across multiple companies and for a longer period of time, the 
average investment in R&D has also been increased, there might also be very different 
reasons for an increase in the number of patents. This could be a new category of intellectual 
property becoming patentable, bureaucratic hurdles being removed or pressure from 
competition fueling the motivation to apply for patents. 
Following the mentioned cosiderations, for the analysis, patents will be used as the chosen 
proxy for innovation. As the objective is to find out how taxation influences innovation, it 
makes sense to use a measure that is directly impacted by taxes. R&D investment is an 
expense, and therefore only directly impacted by taxes if it is deductible from them. This is, as 
laid out in Table 1, not the case for all countries in Europe. The motivation for the application 
for a patent, on the other hand, stems from expecting returns. The rate at which these returns 
are taxed, is therefore certainly relevant for the decision to apply for a patent. 
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5.1.2 Data compilation 
The data on patent applications to the EPO was available through the OECD, which provides 
a range of statistical data on IP. One of the databases, the one used in the present analysis, is 
the REGPAT database, which is available to researchers upon request and offers data on EPO 
and PCT applications at a regional level. It contains three datasets for each the EPO and the 
PCT applications, one on inventors, one on patent applications as well as one that contains the 
application year, all starting in the year 1977. The datasets have been compiled using data 
from PATSTAT, which is the worldwide statistical database. The REGPAT version used is 
from January 2021 and contains PATSTAT data from autumn 2020. 
To determine the number of patents per country per year, the first dataset, spanning about 4 
million rows of applications to the EPO and containing the application ID, the name of the 
applicant, their address including city, post code, regional code and country code, and the 
application share, was merged with the second dataset. This second dataset contains the year 
of first filing to the EPO and the application ID, which can be used as the matching variable. 
Then the dataset was further transformed, first eliminating applications of applicants from 
countries outside of the European OECD member states that wouldn’t be part of the analysis, 
for example countries located outside of Europe, such as South Korea and Japan. After this a 
matrix was created that depicted the number of patents per country per year.  
When first surveying the data, it became clear that the years 2018 to 2020 showed a 
significant drop in numbers of patents per country, indicating that the database might not be 
complete for those years. The analysis will therefore be conducted only up to the year 2017.  
It is worth mentioning that identifying which of the applications was submitted by private 
inventors was nigh impossible with the given dataset, so the assumption is made that 
corporate taxes apply to all applications. Furthermore, the applications used are merely the 
applications made to the EPO, which don’t include patents registered through national patent 
offices. Therefore, the single countries’ patent application numbers are only considered after 
they joined the European Patent convention (EPC), to avoid a distortion of data and to 
account for the increase that might have occurred from the entry alone.  
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5.2 Tax rates 
The data on the statutory corporate income tax rate per country was derived from OECD 
statistics platform (OECD, 2021b) and matched to the patent data using the country code. The 
OECD provides two different statistics on corporate tax data, one with the recent two decades, 
covering the years 2000-2020, and another with historical data, covering the years 1981-1999. 
The latter contains data for fewer countries, resulting in data for some European countries 
lacking, although this goes only for non-OECD members. Of the different tax rates depicted 
in the statistics, the combined corporate income tax rate is used, which contains sub-central 
government taxes. When the corporate income tax rate is progressive, the marginal rate is 
displayed (OECD, 2021b). The tax data is only distinguished on a country level, which means 
that regional differences are not accounted for. While observing the effects on a regional level 
might have given more insight, it would have resulted in quite some challenges. The reason 
for this is that corporate taxes are made up of different sub-taxes in some countries, but not in 
others, and each country has a different system of calculating the individual tax rate. For 
example, Germany has a tax rate at the municipal level, which means differences in tax rate at 
post code level. The compilation of this level of fragmented data, matching it to the patent 
applicants through post code etc. would have had to be done manually, exceeding the scope of 
this paper. 
The capital gains tax is not considered in the present analysis. This is because income that 
results from a patent, or a product that results from the patent, is usually not regarded as 
capital gain, but rather corporate income (European Commission, 2019). 
5.3 Tax credits 
The data on tax credits was also retrieved through the OECD statistics platform. The data is 
available for the years 2000-2020. Many countries have multiple incentive schemes for R&D 
in place, which might apply to different situation, firm sizes or R&D intensity rates. 
Additionally, the data from the OECD includes some forms of R&D tax credits, but not others 
(OECD, 2021a). Therefore, working with a variable depicting the true value of tax credit 
wasn’t viable and a dummy variable was instead created. The limited availability of the tax 
credit data means that the dataset for the main analysis will consist of the years 2000-2017, 




The data on the population of all countries included in the dataset is available through 
Eurostat. France is a complicated case, as they use two different ways of counting their 
population, which is also reflected in the Eurostat data. However, neither of the two ways was 
continuous for all years represented in the dataset. While France métropolitaine is the 
population number for mainland France, the newer counting method in the Eurostat data is for 
France including their territories. As these territories have different country codes and are 
shown separately in REGPAT, the newer population numbers in Eurostat couldn’t be used. 
Therefore, for the population of France (métropolitaine), the author drew upon data from the 
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of France, Insee. 
5.5 GDP per capita 
Data on the GDP per capita of the included countries was taken from Worldbank. To account 
for inflation, the data chosen was the real GDP per capita, displayed in constant 2010$. For all 
countries in the dataset, numbers on the real GDP per capita were available. 
5.6 Patents per population 
To account for differences in population, and the resulting number of patents across countries, 
the analysis will use the number of patents weighted by the population of that year, resulting 
in a variable of patents per million inhabitants. This also controls for increases in patents 
resulting from an increase in population. 
5.7 Missing values 
Although patent data is available for more European countries, the dataset will be limited to 
the European OECD countries, which are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Other EU countries such as 
Bulgaria and Croatia had to be left out of the data set after its compilation due to missing data, 
such as the tax rate. Both of those countries have a very low number of patents, however. 
Similarly, Liechtenstein could not be considered due to the lack of information on adjusted 
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GDP per capita and corporate income tax rate beyond the past 5 years. Since the number of 
patents in total, and particularly per capita, is considerable in the case of Liechtenstein, the 
statistics agency of Liechtenstein was contacted, but they couldn’t provide the information 
either. A similar situation exists for microstates such as Malta, Cyprus, Andorra and San 
Marino.  
Additionally, as only patent applications after officially joining the EPC are regarded, the 
dataset contains limited data for countries such as Norway, who only joined the EPC in 2008. 
This unfortunately results in the dataset for the main regression having a different number of 
observations for each country, making it unbalanced. For the secondary regression, joining 
date to the EPC was ignored, and the panel is therefore balanced, containing data of 16 
countries for the years 1981-2017. 
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6. Methodology 
To estimate the effects of taxes on innovation, a panel two-way fixed effects regression is 
used, which follows the study design presented by Akcigit et al. (2021). The number of 
patents per million inhabitants in the given year and country as dependent variable. The main 
independent variable is the net of tax, or (1-tax). GDP per capita and a dummy for tax credits 
are also included to minimize omitted variable bias. 
6.1 Dynamic effects 
Whenever a change in tax rate becomes public, it takes time for a company to react to those 
changes. While some innovations in reaction to such a change might be done very quickly, as 
they are the result of an inventive process that had been on-going, or even an incremental 
improvement to already existing products, which are simply accelerated by the new incentive, 
other innovative processes will take much longer. Take, for example, a complicated new idea 
that requires a high level of skill and specialization and which might require new researchers 
to be hired, as well as a lengthy period of fine-tuning. In this case the process from the idea to 
a patentable product might take several years. It makes sense therefore to lag the tax variables 
of net of tax (net_inc) and tax credits (tax_cred). In the present analysis, a 3-year lag was 
used. This should appropriately represent the average time it takes an inventor to react to a tax 
change and develop a solution to the point where filing for a patent is viable.  
6.2 Equation 
To find the effect of taxes on innovation, the following specification is estimated:  
ln pat_num_popit = α + β ln(1-citit-3) + γ ln gdp_capit + δ tax_credit-3 + εi + εt + uit 
The variable pat_num_popit is the number of patent application per million inhabitants, per 
country and year. Rather than using the statutory corporate income tax rate (cit) as it is, it is 
transformed into the net of tax by subtracting from 1. The net of tax is additionally lagged by 
three periods, resulting in (1-citit-3). As control variables, GDP per capita (gdp_capit), the real 
GPD per capita in constant US$ per year and country, as well as a dummy variable for tax 
credits (tax_credit), per year and country and lagged by three periods, are used. εi and εt are 
country and year fixed effects, included to separate the differences between the individual 
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countries and the time trend from the effect of the independent variables, while uit constitutes 
the error term. To be able to predict the effect in percent change rather than units, the model is 
estimated using the natural logarithm of each of the variables. 
Since fixed effects regression is a form of OLS regression, the assumption of 
homoskedasticity, the variance of the error term being constant across individuals, must be 
fulfilled. The presence of heteroskedasticity doesn’t cause biased OLS estimates, but produces 
wrong standard errors. To account for heteroskedasticity, which is present in this dataset, 
robust White standard errors are applied. 
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7. Results  
7.1 Regression results 
7.1.1 Main regression 
The results from the main fixed effects regression can be seen in Table 1.  The coefficient 
suggests a negative relationship between net of tax and number of patents, although at a small 
magnitude. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant, which means an effect of a 
change of tax on the number of patents cannot be inferred. This is contrary to what was 
expected. The same is the case for the coefficient of the tax credits, from which we can derive 
that the presence of tax credits doesn’t explain a change in the number of patents either. The 
only variable with explanatory power is therefore the GDP per capita. 
7.1.2 Secondary regression 
As can be seen in Table 2, for the dataset with the longer time period, the same conclusions 
can be drawn from the results of the secondary regression in comparison with the main one.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Results: 2000-2017 
      (1) 
    ln_pat_num 
ln_net_of_tax_lag3 -.179 
   (.393) 
ln_gdp_pc 1.33** 
   (.478) 
tax_cred_lag3 -9.812* 
   (4.943) 
_cons 354 
   .256 
Observations Yes 
R-squared Yes 
Country Dummy -.179 
Year Dummy (.393) 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 









Regression Results: 1981-2017 
      (1) 
    ln_pat_num 
ln_net_of_tax_lag3 -.053 
   (.346) 
ln_gdp_pc 1.438*** 
   (.36) 
_cons -11.748*** 
   (3.699) 
Observations 589 
R-squared .784 
Country Dummy Yes 
Year Dummy Yes 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 




The results seem counterintuitive at first, as previous literature has generally found a link 
between taxes and the innovation outcome. Considering the case of single countries in 
Europe, however, the results don’t seem entirely unreasonable. While Germany has one of 
the higher patent numbers per million inhabitants, their corporate taxes are among the higher 
in Europe and it doesn’t offer R&D tax credits. The opposite is true for countries such as 
Ireland and Hungary, who are generous in terms of overall corporate tax rate and offer tax 
credits, but have a fairly low number of patents per million inhabitants, making the link with 
the level of GDP per capita in this case is quite clear. On an individual country level, it 
would therefore be interesting to see the immediate reaction to tax increases and decreases.  
7.2.1 Comparison with Akcigit et al. (2021) 
The results obtained in this thesis deviate considerably from the results described by Akcigit 
et al. (2021) in their similar study conducted on U.S. data. In their study, they found that a 
decrease in the marginal corporate tax rate leads to an increase in the number of patents. The 
results of the here presented analysis are, in comparison with Akcigit et al. (2021) as well as 
additional literature, such as Atanassov & Liu (2020), not significant and therefore don’t 
give any explanatory power to the corporate income tax rate.  
Of course, the econometric model of this thesis is simpler than the one presented by Akcigit 
et al (2021). Furthermore, the data they observe spans over almost a century, while the data 
observed in the main regression of this work only captures about two decades. However, it is 
likely that the differences lie not only in the methodology, but also in the differences 
between the U.S. and the European economy and their patenting systems. Since Europe and 
the U.S. have moved away from being manufacturing economies to being knowledge 
economies, services and high tech such as biotechnology, but most importantly software, 
have become the largest contributors to the GDP (Palazzi, 2011). However, while software 
and business models can be patented in the U.S., they are not patentable under EPO 
regulations. With a shift from industrial products that run on mechanics alone to machinery 
that, despite possibly even having a mechanic mechanism, requires software to run, it is easy 
to believe that the increase in software, combined with the patentability of software in the 
U.S., contributed to a steady rise in patents in the U.S. In Europe, software is not eligible for 
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patents. This means that a lot of the innovative activity that was invested into the 
programming of machines and computers through software, won’t be depicted in a rise of 
patents in the case of European patents. Blind et al. (2006) mention the patentability of new 
categories as one possible reason for a surge in patents. This would reflect why the same 
effects cannot be observed between the U.S. and Europe.  
Additionally, cultural and economic differences have to be considered. While most European 
countries are on the spectrum of being coordinated market economies, the U.S. are a clear 
example of liberal market economies. In coordinated market economies, not only is the 
mentality towards paying taxes different, loyalty towards employees also has a high level of 
importance and employee protection is embedded in the law. And although companies 
equally engage in tax optimizing strategies, the overall atmosphere that these cultural and 
institutional differences create is one possible reason. 
7.2.2 Limitations 
With the data available through the REGPAT database, it was not possible to observe 
differences across industries, as the patent data is not classified into industries. It would be 
interesting to see whether there are differences across industries. While both examine the 
effect of R&D tax credits rather than the overall corporate income tax rate, it is still 
interesting to see that Thomson (2017) and Chen and Yang (2019) achieve conflicting results 
in regards to cross-industry differences.  
As Mukherjee et al. (2017) find a stronger effect of tax increases on innovation, and, not too 
differently from the results of this thesis, weak effects of tax decreases, it would be 
interesting to study this on European data as well. However, due to the nature of European 
corporate tax development, which has seen a steady decline for most countries in the 
observed time period, the impact of a tax increase is difficult to measure.  
Additionally, this study fails to fully take into account the differences in innovation that exist 
within a country. There are quite large regional differences in most European countries 
which this analysis couldn’t reflect. Using firm-level data on individual countries in Europe 
might help give more insight into how the tax rate plays into the innovative activity of firms.  
Similarly, some European countries also have different corporate income taxes on regional 
levels. An example of that is Germany, where a large part of the tax is levied at a municipal 
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level, with large differences even within neighboring municipalities. In such a case, the 
statutory corporate income tax rate may not adequately consider all nuances and within-
country differences, as well as changes that occur in corporate income tax on a regional level 
that might have just as strong an impact, if not stronger, on how a company chooses to 
partake in innovative activity. Additionally, countries with patent boxes have different tax on 
patents, which may distort the some of the effects if only the statutory corporate income tax 
rate is considered. On the other hand, a lower corporate tax could still result in more patents 
because of the higher net of tax that is available for reinvestment. 
Lastly, the analysis was conducted using the number of patent applications and doesn’t 
reflect the number of granted patents. A few scenarios come to mind where this might be an 
issue. It could be, for example, that with increasing availability of data in the past decades, 
the patent granting process has also become more predictable, leading to a better application-
to-grant ratio. This could mean that even though an effect of lower corporate income taxes 
couldn’t be observed, it occurred, but was masked by a lowering number of applications in 
comparison to the patents granted.   
7.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
As discussed above, the topic of finding instruments to encourage R&D in Europe is a 
hitherto insufficiently explored topic. The here proposed areas of future research are closely 
linked to the limitations on the analysis conducted in this thesis and open up the opportunity 
to add to the presented results or alternatively take them into a new direction. More insight, 
particularly more granular insight, needs to be generated to receive answers on how to shape 
policies in the future. On a first level, studies on corporate income taxation and its effect on 
innovation on either an industry-level or a firm-level could provide useful insight, such as 
the possibility to identify if certain groups on either of these levels react differently to 
different forms of incentive. Valuable insights could also be generated through a more 
granular study that studies the relationship of tax rates and patent numbers on a regional 
level.  
Even though the effectiveness of R&D tax credit is widely confirmed throughout literature, 
its effects need to be studied in a more detailed way, with more concrete insights for Europe 
and accounting for firm size, industry, organizational form, financial situation and asset 
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distribution and similar indicators. With data becoming more easily available through 
digitalization, this topic might be more easily explored in the future.  
Promising results can also be expected from a study into the effects of extending patentable 
categories in Europe. This would have to be done on a hypothetical basis and could 
contribute to the discussion on encouraging innovation in a very different way. Most 
importantly, it might give clues on whether a measure such as that would level the playing 
field between Europe in the U.S. when it comes to innovation.  
A highly interesting field of research that is yet widely unexplored is innovation hubs and 
their role in the innovative activity of companies, as well as how policy makers can 
encourage the establishment of innovation clusters in their respective countries. Engel & del-
Palacio (2009) provide a characterization of clusters of innovation (COI): heightened 
mobility of resources, increased speed of business development and a culture of mobility that 
is associated with an affinity for collaboration are what makes COIs so unique. As Berger & 
Brem (2017) point out, many European companies have already established an innovation 
hub in Silicon Valley to utilize the present ecosystem. Innovation hubs exist in Europe as 
well, but not as concentrated as in San Francisco. Engel (2015) provides a qualitative 
examination of existing clusters and derives practices for policy makers. Adding a 




In this thesis, the aim was to analyze the relationship between corporate income taxation and 
innovation in Europe to further the discussion regarding which policy tool is optimal to 
encourage innovation. This was done using a fixed effects regression on a panel of data of 
European OECD member states for two different time periods, for which the effects of the 
statutory corporate tax rate on the number of patents per million inhabitants were estimated. 
This resulted in a larger dataset containing all current OECD members starting with their 
joining date to the EPC, with the longest observed period being 2000 to 2017, and a dataset 
with a longer time period from 1981 to 2017, containing all OECD members for which 
patent and tax data was available for the entire period.  
The results of both regressions fail to show a significant effect of corporate income taxation 
on the number of patents. This is in contrast to the findings of Akcigit et al. (2021), who 
conducted a similar study using U.S. data, which could be for a few different reasons, such 
as differences in patenting systems, economic and cultural structure, but also methodology.  
The obtained results point to corporate income tax not being the optimal instrument to 
encourage innovation and decreasing it to be unlikely to have the desired effect. Therefore, 
more research is required into what instruments have the best effects on innovation in 
Europe. Two potential avenues are open to future researchers. One is studying the 
effectiveness of tax incentive or corporate income tax decreases on a more granular level, 
such as firm- or industry-level. The other option is to study possibilities for fostering 
innovation that are unrelated to tax, such as the creation of clusters of innovation and the 
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Overview of Variables 
Variable Variable Name Description 
Number of patent 
applications to the EPO per 
million inhabitants 
pat_num_pop Number of Patent Applications to the EPO per 
country per year, weighted by the respective 
country’s population of each year 
Statutory corporate income 
tax  
cit The statutory corporate income tax rate per 
country per year 
GDP per capita gdp_cap Real GDP per capita for each country and year, 
measured in constant 2010 US$ 
Tax credit dummy tax_cred Tax credit dummy that depicts the presence of 
R&D tax credig in any given year and country 
Net of tax net_inc 1-cit 
Log of Number of Patents 
per million inhabitants 
ln_pat_num Natural logarithm of pat_num_pop 
Log of lagged net of tax ln_net_of_tax_lag3 Natural logarithm of net_inc, which was 
previously lagged by 3 years 
Log of GDP per capita ln_gdp_pc Natural logarithm of gdp_cap 
Tax credit dummy, lagged tax_cred_lag3 Tax credit dummy lagged by 3 years 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table A.1: Main Regression Dataset 
Summary statistics:   Mean, Minimum, Maximum, Range (by year)  
year: 2000  
     mean   min   max   range 
 Number of Patents by Population 181.371 4 529.42 525.42 
 GDP per capita 43501.268 21497.5 93462.926 71965.426 




 Number of Patents by Population 189.849 4.84 578.563 573.723 
 GDP per capita 44194.559 21761.331 94695.34 72934.009 
 Net of tax .668 .598 .8 .202 
 
2002  
 Number of Patents by Population 156.202 1.115 599.257 598.141 
 GDP per capita 38682.497 11161.463 97287.598 86126.135 
 Net of tax .69 .598 .84 .242 
 
2003  
 Number of Patents by Population 156.637 4.279 610.622 606.343 
 GDP per capita 37763.072 11782.994 97678.46 85895.466 
 Net of tax .701 .604 .875 .271 
 
2004  
 Number of Patents by Population 147.637 1.177 645.696 644.519 
 GDP per capita 36480.374 9612.57 99778.47 90165.9 
 Net of tax .725 .617 .875 .258 
 
2005  
 Number of Patents by Population 158.864 1.49 767.513 766.023 
 GDP per capita 36302.564 9954.042 101380.77 91426.733 
 Net of tax .74 .616 .875 .259 
 
2006  
 Number of Patents by Population 162.187 2.128 753.707 751.58 
 GDP per capita 37603.557 10571.035 104943.44 94372.404 
 Net of tax .741 .616 .875 .259 
 
2007  
 Number of Patents by Population 169.822 3.2 810.606 807.406 
 GDP per capita 39042.392 11323.661 111968.35 100644.69 
 Net of tax .748 .616 .875 .259 
 
2008  
 Number of Patents by Population 166.138 3.424 754.198 750.774 
 GDP per capita 40838.885 11797.642 108577.35 96779.709 
 Net of tax .759 .656 .875 .219 
 
2009  
 Number of Patents by Population 162.503 3.53 753.799 750.269 
 GDP per capita 38678.609 11551.107 101939.61 90388.506 
 Net of tax .759 .656 .875 .219 
 
2010  
 Number of Patents by Population 165.797 2.864 804.675 801.811 
 GDP per capita 39232.351 11383.522 104965.31 93581.784 
 Net of tax .761 .656 .875 .219 
 
2011  
 Number of Patents by Population 169.063 6.748 855.736 848.988 
 GDP per capita 39662.776 12342.602 105264.75 92922.148 
 Net of tax .761 .639 .875 .236 
 
2012  
 Number of Patents by Population 169.303 5.181 819.277 814.096 
 GDP per capita 39411.543 13027.971 102404.61 89376.641 




 Number of Patents by Population 167.489 6.653 750.411 743.758 
 GDP per capita 39530.202 13472.465 103721.75 90249.284 
 Net of tax .76 .62 .875 .255 
 
2014  
 Number of Patents by Population 163.489 5.724 733.154 727.43 
 GDP per capita 40165 13745.954 105658.52 91912.567 
 Net of tax .764 .62 .875 .255 
 
2015  
 Number of Patents by Population 164.756 8.485 778.033 769.548 
 GDP per capita 41311.607 14414.254 107638.21 93223.958 
 Net of tax .765 .62 .875 .255 
 
2016  
 Number of Patents by Population 165.518 7.789 826.032 818.242 
 GDP per capita 42060.293 14891.767 110162.12 95270.355 
 Net of tax .769 .656 .875 .219 
 
2017  
 Number of Patents by Population 163.959 8.778 707.758 698.979 
 GDP per capita 43018.957 15512.725 109452.96 93940.235 
 Net of tax .771 .556 .91 .354 
 
 
Table A.2: Secondary Regression Dataset 
Summary statistics:   Mean, Minimum, Maximum, Range (by year) 
year: 1981  
     mean   min   max   range 
 Number of Patents by Population 44.9 .509 218.776 218.267 
 GDP per capita 28011.199 12463.936 55466.164 43002.227 
 Net of tax .522 .385 .67 .285 
 
1982  
 Number of Patents by Population 48.04 .101 230.978 230.877 
 GDP per capita 28177.542 12652.502 54420.972 41768.47 
 Net of tax .515 .382 .67 .287 
 
1983  
 Number of Patents by Population 52.116 .101 243.225 243.124 
 GDP per capita 28624.313 12572.133 54534.426 41962.293 
 Net of tax .512 .385 .67 .285 
 
1984  
 Number of Patents by Population 59.565 .1 277.232 277.132 
 GDP per capita 29426.028 12288.433 55973.701 43685.268 
 Net of tax .518 .382 .671 .289 
 
1985  
 Number of Patents by Population 63.935 .2 279.589 279.39 
 GDP per capita 30286.863 12598.913 57774.344 45175.431 
 Net of tax .513 .382 .681 .299 
 
1986  
 Number of Patents by Population 67.469 .199 274.949 274.75 
 GDP per capita 31025.84 13108.701 58641.979 45533.278 




 Number of Patents by Population 70.031 .598 287.733 287.135 
 GDP per capita 31660.933 13948.976 59391.574 45442.598 
 Net of tax .532 .4 .683 .283 
 
1988  
 Number of Patents by Population 78.035 .898 315.983 315.086 
 GDP per capita 32603.269 15009.225 60588.597 45579.373 
 Net of tax .536 .4 .694 .294 
 
1989  
 Number of Patents by Population 83.986 .699 337.161 336.462 
 GDP per capita 33594.605 15999.244 62703.529 46704.285 
 Net of tax .563 .399 .7 .301 
 
1990  
 Number of Patents by Population 89.673 .5 351.671 351.171 
 GDP per capita 34371.77 16667.585 64343.519 47675.934 
 Net of tax .584 .455 .7 .245 
 
1991  
 Number of Patents by Population 78.366 .501 315.96 315.458 
 GDP per capita 34579.974 17435.799 62962.391 45526.592 
 Net of tax .605 .438 .723 .285 
 
1992  
 Number of Patents by Population 82.243 1.407 321.946 320.539 
 GDP per capita 34769.203 17639.468 63629.689 45990.221 
 Net of tax .628 .418 .72 .302 
 
1993  
 Number of Patents by Population 83.988 1.507 321.224 319.717 
 GDP per capita 34631.788 17257.922 65051.798 47793.875 
 Net of tax .64 .435 .75 .315 
 
1994  
 Number of Patents by Population 86.582 2.907 302.645 299.737 
 GDP per capita 35595.515 17377.609 67952.427 50574.818 
 Net of tax .641 .468 .75 .282 
 
1995  
 Number of Patents by Population 93.291 2.183 318.136 315.953 
 GDP per capita 36544.277 18059.224 70409.719 52350.496 
 Net of tax .639 .449 .75 .301 
 
1996  
 Number of Patents by Population 99.712 2.091 342.379 340.288 
 GDP per capita 37386.946 18621.914 73575.993 54954.079 
 Net of tax .638 .441 .72 .279 
 
1997  
 Number of Patents by Population 116.13 2.281 400.771 398.49 
 GDP per capita 38713.675 19354.835 77045.295 57690.46 
 Net of tax .636 .432 .72 .288 
 
1998  
 Number of Patents by Population 132.071 2.368 448.251 445.883 
 GDP per capita 39962.857 20183.147 78597.916 58414.769 




 Number of Patents by Population 144.171 4.516 473.501 468.985 
 GDP per capita 41207.625 20853.33 79632.82 58779.49 
 Net of tax .656 .48 .749 .269 
 
2000  
 Number of Patents by Population 160.543 4 529.42 525.42 
 GDP per capita 42763.17 21497.5 81653.345 60155.844 
 Net of tax .659 .484 .76 .276 
 
2001  
 Number of Patents by Population 170.308 4.84 578.563 573.723 
 GDP per capita 43459.023 21761.331 82926.769 61165.437 
 Net of tax .674 .597 .8 .203 
 
2002  
 Number of Patents by Population 171.929 3.944 599.257 595.313 
 GDP per capita 43870.869 21809.324 83673.637 61864.313 
 Net of tax .681 .597 .84 .243 
 
2003  
 Number of Patents by Population 172.893 5.266 610.622 605.356 
 GDP per capita 44155.518 21525.423 83941.366 62415.942 
 Net of tax .687 .604 .875 .271 
 
2004  
 Number of Patents by Population 180.702 6.684 645.696 639.012 
 GDP per capita 45310.849 21858.124 86759.142 64901.017 
 Net of tax .692 .617 .875 .258 
 
2005  
 Number of Patents by Population 191.335 6.381 697.63 691.249 
 GDP per capita 46147.118 21988.189 88432.62 66444.431 
 Net of tax .707 .616 .875 .259 
 
2006  
 Number of Patents by Population 198.589 10.814 753.707 742.894 
 GDP per capita 47432.379 22305.244 89828.425 67523.181 
 Net of tax .709 .616 .875 .259 
 
2007  
 Number of Patents by Population 204.742 9.589 768.305 758.715 
 GDP per capita 48608.845 22819.504 91565.733 68746.23 
 Net of tax .719 .616 .875 .259 
 
2008  
 Number of Patents by Population 205.291 9.949 754.198 744.249 
 GDP per capita 48327.764 22859.369 90862.4 68003.03 
 Net of tax .731 .656 .875 .219 
 
2009  
 Number of Patents by Population 198.483 10.906 736.316 725.41 
 GDP per capita 46113.14 22124.58 88174.158 66049.578 
 Net of tax .732 .656 .875 .219 
 
2010  
 Number of Patents by Population 201.859 6.526 743.019 736.493 
 GDP per capita 46741.304 22498.691 87693.79 65195.099 
 Net of tax .733 .656 .875 .219 
 
2011  
 Number of Patents by Population 206.009 7.731 763.138 755.407 
43 
 GDP per capita 47071.845 22149.631 87413.177 65263.546 
 Net of tax .735 .639 .875 .236 
 
2012  
 Number of Patents by Population 206.675 8.298 742.961 734.662 
 GDP per capita 46732.952 21337.286 88604.575 67267.289 
 Net of tax .735 .639 .875 .236 
 
2013  
 Number of Patents by Population 206.113 9.088 733.046 723.958 
 GDP per capita 46655.683 21256.76 88444.895 67188.135 
 Net of tax .733 .62 .875 .255 
 
2014  
 Number of Patents by Population 201.075 10.525 692.169 681.644 
 GDP per capita 47287.618 21540.988 89175.5 67634.512 
 Net of tax .738 .62 .875 .255 
 
2015  
 Number of Patents by Population 200.821 9.67 709.546 699.875 
 GDP per capita 48608.546 22018.009 90029.356 68011.346 
 Net of tax .74 .62 .875 .255 
 
2016  
 Number of Patents by Population 199.523 7.789 717.414 709.625 
 GDP per capita 49259.355 22533.632 90195.964 67662.331 
 Net of tax .746 .656 .875 .219 
 
2017  
 Number of Patents by Population 204.813 9.565 707.758 698.192 
 GDP per capita 50374.045 23052.986 91549.038 68496.052 








Notes: The four maps depict the average number of patent applications to the EPO per 
million inhabitants for the period 1981-2017 in decade-long increments, from left to right 
and top to bottom.  
Maps created with mapchart.net 
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Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate Over Time 
Figure 2 
 
Notes: The four maps depict the average statutory coroprate income tax rate for the period 
1981-2017 in decade-long increments, from left to right and top to bottom.  
*For the period of 1991-2000, for some countries only data on the year 2000 was available. 
In this case, that year’s corporate income tax rate was used instead of an average.  
Maps created with mapchart.net 
 
